Rights and Obligations of Third Parties in Armed Conflicts by Krieger, Heike































 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2888989 




KFG Working Paper Series 
 
Edited by Heike Krieger, Georg Nolte and Andreas Zimmermann 
 
All KFG Working Papers are available on the KFG website at www.kfg-intlaw.de. 


















Berlin Potsdam Research Group  
International Law – Rise or Decline?   
Unter den Linden 9  
10099 Berlin, Germany 
info@kfg-intlaw.de 
+49 (0)30 2093-3322 
www.kfg-intlaw.de 
Krieger, Heike, Rights and Obligations of Third Parties in Armed Conflicts, KFG Working Paper 
Series, No. 5, Berlin Potsdam Research Group “The International Rule of Law – Rise or Decline?”, 
Berlin, December 2016. 
ISSN 2509-3770 (Internet) 
ISSN 2509-3762 (Print) 
This publication has been funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG) 
Product of Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin 
Commercial use is not permitted 






Rights and Obligations of Third Parties in Armed Conflicts* 
Heike Krieger1 
For publication in: Eyal Benvenisti and Georg Nolte (eds.), Community Obligations in International 
Law, 2017, Forthcoming 
 
Abstract: 
This paper will turn into a contribution to a book on community obligations in international law. It is 
often said that international law has developed from a legal order which is designed to protect 
sovereignty to a system which also promotes community interests. This shift is said to be reflected 
in structural changes of the legal system. The creation of rights and obligations for third parties is 
generally seen as a part of this perceived paradigmatic shift. Community interests can be furthered 
either by negative duties of abstention, by an entitlement for third states, or even by duties to take 
positive measures. Since the shift towards protecting community interests apparently requires some 
form of cooperation, positive rights and duties to protect and to promote appear to be 
indispensable. Authors relying on a community perspective often dismiss duties of abstention as an 
expression of indifference in the face of a violation of a fundamental norm. Solidarity seems to 
require that third states take a more proactive role in actively enforcing community interests. The 
paper aims to test this understanding on the basis of an analysis of rights and obligations of third 
states in armed conflict. In order to argue that duties of abstention of third states are a central 
instrument for promoting community interests in relation to armed conflicts, the paper will first 
trace pertinent structural changes in international law. In particular, it will question the extent to 
which positive rights and obligations of third states have been firmly established in international 
law. In a second step, this contribution will evaluate the overall tendencies in the ongoing 
lawmaking process for promoting community interests in relation to armed conflict. 
 
  
                                                        
* Special thanks go to Simon Blätgen und Sophie Schuberth for their meticulous work on the footnotes. 
1 Professor of Law, Freie Universität Berlin; Max Planck Fellow at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative 
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1. Protecting community interests: a progress narrative? 
It is often said that international law has developed from a legal order which is designed to protect 
state sovereignty to a system which also defends and promotes community interests. This shift is 
said to be reflected in structural changes of the legal system.2 Traditional international law has 
often been understood as a system of bilateral legal relations,3 in particular when it comes to self-
help and reprisals against international wrongful acts. In contrast, community interests are said to 
be legally protected interests or values which do not (only) concern the direct relationship 
between two states, but which affect all members of the international legal community4 and 
require collective action for their realization. They appeal to a shared understanding of solidarity,5 
which finds its legal expression in the creation of rights and obligations for third parties.6 The 
creation of such rights and duties is generally seen as a part of the paradigmatic shift that 
international law has undergone towards protecting community interests.7  
The present contribution aims to test this understanding on the basis of an analysis of rights and 
obligations of third states in armed conflict. While the concept of third parties may be understood 
in a broad way as encompassing international organizations as well as non-state actors, the paper 
focuses on the role of third states because the protection of community interests in armed conflict 
is to a large extent an issue of law-enforcement by third states: The need for international 
solidarity through the collective action of third states is particularly tangible in cases of flagrant 
violations of the prohibition of the use of force. Where territory is illegally annexed, the state that 
is a victim of such an act will have to rely on the solidarity of third states lest the illegal act 
eventually be validated. Accordingly, the duty of non-recognition in cases of violations of the 
prohibition of the use of force developed simultaneously with the prohibition itself8 and is well 
established in customary international law,9 upheld by international courts and tribunals,10 and 
                                                        
2 Georges Abi-Saab, ‘Whither the International Community?’(1998) EJIL 248, 250; Santiago Villalpando, ‘The 
Legal Dimension of the International Community: How Community Interests are Protected in International Law’ 
(2010) Vol. 21(2) EJIL 387, 388. 
3 Christine Chinkin, Third parties in international law (Clarendon Press 1993) 1. 
4 Cf. Bruno Simma, ‘From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Law’ (1994) 250 RdC 217, at 233; 
Andreas Paulus/Bruno Simma, ‘The “International Community”: Facing the Challenge of Globalization’ (1998) 
EJIL 266, 268; see also Isabel Feichtner, ‘Community Interest,’ in: Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed.), Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law [MPEPIL] (2007), para. 4 et seq.; Gleider Hernández, ‘A Reluctant 
Guardian: The International Court of Justice and the Concept of “International Community”’ (2013) Vol. 83 No. 1 
BYIL 13, 20 et seq. 
5 Helmut Aust, Complicity and the law of state responsibility (CUP 2011) 24 et seq. 
6 Cf. Simma, ‘From Bilateralism to Community Interest’ (n 4) 375. 
7 Cf. Simma, ‘From Bilateralism to Community Interest’ (n 4)  375. 
8 Heike Krieger, Das Effektivitätsprinzip im Völkerrecht (Duncker & Humblot 2000), Chapter 7; some authors 
restrict the duty of non-recognition to cases of the illegal annexation of territory; see Judge Kooijmans, Legal 
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Separate Opinion of Judge 
Kooijmans) [2004] ICJ Rep 219, paras. 43 et seq. 
9 Martin Dawidowicz, ‘The Obligation of Non-Recognition of an Unlawful Situation,’ in: James Crawford and 
others (eds.), The Law of International Responsibility (OUP 2010) 677, 678/684. 
10 In particular: Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall (Advisory Opinion) [2004] ICJ Rep 136, para. 87; 
see also Stefan Talmon, ‘The Duty Not to “Recognize as Lawful” a Situation Created by the Illegal Use of Force 
or other Serious Breaches of a Jus Cogens Obligation, an Obligation without Real Substance?’, in: Christian 
Tomuschat and others (eds.), The Fundamental Rules of the International Legal Order: Jus Cogens and 
Obligations Erga Omnes (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2005) 99 et seqq. 




reflected in the work of the ILC.11  If “all States can be held to have a legal interest in the 
protection“12 of community interests, a separate category of third states might appear to be 
superfluous.13 However, the concept of third states depends on the legal context in which it is used. 
Rights and duties of third states in armed conflicts arise outside bilateral relationships between 
belligerents upon the outbreak or in the course of an armed conflict under the pertinent rules of 
jus ad bellum and jus in bello as well as general international law.14  
The perceived structural shift which international law has undergone towards protecting 
community interests is often related to the concepts of jus cogens and erga omnes. Because of “the 
importance of the rights involved, [according to which] all States can be held to have a legal 
interest in their protection,“15 many community interests are identified by the jus cogens nature 
and erga omnes character of the rules in which they are enshrined.16 The prohibition of the use of 
force is the quintessential jus cogens/erga omnes norm. In the Barcelona Traction case, the Court 
gave the “outlawing of acts of aggression” as an example of erga omnes obligations. 17  In 
international humanitarian law, Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions aims to protect 
“elementary considerations of humanity,”18 the importance of the protective rules for the human 
person19 or “the value of protecting human life and dignity.”20 The ICRC Commentary equates the 
effects of Common Art. 1 GC I-IV with the effects of Art. 1 of the Genocide Convention.21 Common 
Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions is thus understood as laying down an erga omnes (partes) 
obligation which is also included in customary international law.22  
This categorization is considered to influence the way in which legal concepts and instruments 
promote community interests. Such interests can be furthered either by negative duties of 
                                                        
11 ILC, ‘Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries’ (2001) 
ILC-Ybk, vol. II, Part Two, Art. 41 para. 2 ASR, 114. 
12 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v Spain) (Judgement) [1970] ICJ Rep 3, para. 
33. 
13 Chinkin, Third parties (n 3) 11 for further arguments; Paolo Palchetti, ‘Consequences for Third States as a 
Result of an Unlawful use of Force,’ in: Marc Weller (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in 
International Law (OUP 2015) 1225. 
14 Chinkin, Third parties (n 3) 7; Palchetti, ‘Consequences for Third States,’ in: Weller (ed.), The Oxford Handbook 
(n 13) 1225; from the perspective of state responsibility, see Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, ‘Countermeasures in 
Response to Grave Violations of Obligations Owed to the International Community, Ch 80,’ in: Crawford and 
others (eds.), The Law of International Responsibility (OUP 2010) 1137, 1138 who argues for a differentiation 
between states directly injured and those indirectly affected. 
15 Barcelona Traction (Belgium v Spain) (Judgement) [1970] ICJ Rep, para. 33. 
16 Dire Tladi, ‘First Report on jus cogens by Dire Tladi, Special Rapporteur’ (2 May- 10 June and 4 July- 12 August 
2016) UN Doc A/CN.4/693, para. 63; Christian Tomuschat, ‘Obligations arising for States without or against their 
will’ (1993) 241 RdC 195, 307. 
17 Barcelona Traction (Belgium v Spain) (Judgement) [1970] ICJ Rep, para. 34. 
18 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) (Merits) 
(Judgment) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, para. 218. 
19 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep, 226, para. 79: “It is 
undoubtedly because a great many rules of humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict are so fundamental 
to the respect of the human person and ‘elementary considerations of humanity’ … that the Hague and 
Geneva Conventions have enjoyed a broad accession.”; ICRC, Commentary on the First Geneva Convention: 
Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (2nd 
edn 2016), Introduction, para. 119.  
20 ICRC, Commentary on the First Geneva Convention (n 19), Introduction, para. 37. 
21 ICRC, Commentary on the First Geneva Convention (n 19), Introduction, para. 119 note 2. 
22 Rule 144 of the Study; on the differentiation between obligations erga omnes and erga omnes partes, see 
Christian Tams, Enforcing obligations erga omnes in international law (CUP 2007) 117-128. 




abstention, by an entitlement (right) for third states, or even by duties to take positive measures. 
On the basis of the jus cogens/erga omnes character of Art. 2 para. 4 UN Charter and Art. 1 GC I-IV, 
rights and duties to take positive measures in the community interest have been promoted in legal 
discourse. Since the shift towards protecting community interests apparently requires some form 
of cooperation, positive rights and duties to protect and to promote appear to be indispensable.23 
At the same time, authors relying on a community perspective often dismiss duties of abstention, 
in particular those enshrined in the law of neutrality, as an expression of indifference in the face of 
a violation of a fundamental norm of the international community.24 Solidarity seems to require 
that third states take a more proactive role in actively enforcing community interests.25 In contrast, 
traditional Westphalian international law is said to have established negative duties of abstention 
to realize its purpose “to keep States peacefully apart” in order to deal with the breakup of a 
community in the aftermath of the European period of religious wars. 26 For the purpose of 
guaranteeing the status quo by preventing war, it appeared sufficient to mutually respect each 
other’s sovereignty and territory.27 However, despite the perception that duties of abstention are 
closely related to the traditional Westphalian paradigm, this paper will argue that these duties can 
significantly contribute to the protection of community interests in international law. The basic aim 
of duties of abstention not to deepen or perpetuate the violation of such an interest but to further 
de-escalation forms a particularly important element in the overall protection or reestablishment 
of international peace in ongoing armed conflicts.  
In order to argue that duties of abstention of third states are a central instrument for promoting 
community interests in relation to armed conflicts, the paper will first trace pertinent structural 
changes in international law. In particular, it will question the extent to which positive rights and 
obligations of third states have been firmly established in international law (Part II). In a second 
step, this contribution will evaluate the overall tendencies in the ongoing lawmaking process for 
promoting community interests in relation to armed conflict (Part III). 
2. Community interest and law-enforcement: Positive obligations instead of duties of 
abstention? 
Pertinent rights and obligations of third states stem not only from the general rules of state 
responsibility in cases of grave breaches of obligations owed to the international community as a 
whole (Art. 40, 41, 48, 54 ASR) or in cases of complicity (Art. 16 ASR), but also from primary law rules 
on the prohibition on the use of force or the principle of non-intervention under customary 
international law as well as treaty law in Art. 2 para. 4 UN Charter, Art. 39-51 UN Charter and Art. 2 
                                                        
23 Abi Saab, ‘Whither the International Community?’ (n 2) 252; Wolfgang Friedmann, The Changing Structure of 
International Law (Stevens 1964) 62; Villalpando, ‘The Legal Dimension of the International Community’ (n 2) 
392. 
24 Hersch Lauterpacht, ‚Neutrality and Collective Security,’ in: Elihu Lauterpacht (ed.), International Law, Vol.5 
Collected Papers, Part XIII: Neutrality (CUP 2004) 625. 
25 Palchetti, ‘Consequences for Third States,’ in: Weller (ed.), The Oxford Handbook (n 13) 1229. 
26 Abi-Saab, ‘Whither the International Community?’ (n 2) 251 quoting David Mitrany, A Working Peace System 
(Chicago Quadrangle Books, 1966) 28; Villalpando, ‘The Legal Dimension of the International Community’ (n 2), 
390. 
27 Abi-Saab, ‘Whither the International Community?’ (n 2) 252. 




para. 5 UN Charter, from specific primary law regimes, i.e., the law of neutrality, as well as from the 
Geneva Conventions, in particular Common Art. 1 GC I-IV.28 
a) Entitlement to take measures in the collective interest 
The idea that states should not remain indifferent in view of a violation of a community interest 
forms the basis of the UN Charter collective security system. Corresponding institutions developed 
in order to make cooperation through collective action more effective and legitimate. This process 
is exemplified by the introduction of a system of collective security in the League of Nations and 
under the UN Charter. The preamble of the UN Charter describes the maintenance of international 
peace and security, which is a basic precondition for the international order, as a community 
interest.29 By formulating the purpose “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war,” it 
allows for the use of force only in the common interest.30 Under the UN Charter’s collective security 
system, an attack on one state symbolizes an attack on all states and undermines the security of 
the entire international community. Thus, the protection of states and their sovereignty from 
military attacks is seen as a part of the community interest to protect international peace and 
security, 31  the realization of which is entrusted to the Security Council which can create 
corresponding rights and duties not only for belligerents but also for third states.32 According to 
Art. 1 para. 1 UN Charter, the UN is established “to take effective collective measures for the 
prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or 
other breaches of the peace.” Sanctions which member states have to implement according to Arts. 
39, 41, 42 and 25 UN Charter encompass negative duties of abstention, such as the duty of non-
recognition in cases of acquisition of territory by violations of the use of force33 as well as positive 
measures including economic embargos or military action.34  
However, in view of the Security Council’s inertia, decentralized countermeasures in the community 
interest are still an important instrument. Such measures include instituting proceedings before 
international tribunals or taking coercive measures. In both cases they “require individual States to 
establish that they should be entitled to defend a given community interest.”35  In view of the ICJ’s 
definition of the erga omnes concept36 as well as Art. 48 ARS, it is widely assumed that all states 
have a standing before the ICJ where the violation of an erga omnes norm is concerned.37 In his 
                                                        
28 This contribution does not deal with rights and duties of third states under concepts such as R2P or 
universal jurisdiction, because they are covered in other contributions to this volume. 
29 Feichtner, ‘Community Interest,’ in: Wolfrum (ed.), MPEPIL (n 4), para. 15, Villalpando, ‘The Legal Dimension of 
the International Community’ (n 2) para. 15. 
30 “… to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be 
used, save in the common interest …”  
31 Hitoshi Nasu, ‘The Expanded Conception of Security and International Law: Challenges to the UN Collective 
Security System’ (2011), ANU College of Law Research Paper No. 11-28, 16, 28, available at 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1922928> last accessed 14 October 2016. 
32 Abi-Saab, ‘Whither the International Community?’ (n 2) 257f. 
33 Ian Brownlie and James Crawford, Brownlie's principles of public international law (OUP 2012), 155. 
34 Nico Krisch, ’Article 41,’ in: Bruno Simma and others (eds.), The Charter of the United Nations: A commentary 
(OUP 2012), para. 12-13. 
35 Christian Tams, ‘Inidvidual States as Guardians of Community Interests,’ in: U Fastenrath and others (eds.), 
From Bilateralism to Community Interest, Essays in Honour of Judge Bruno Simma (OUP 2011) 379, 381. 
36 Barcelona Traction (Belgium v Spain) (Judgement) [1970] ICJ Rep, para. 33. 
37 Tams, ‘Inidvidual States,’ in: Fastenrath and others (eds.), From Bilateralism to Community Interest (n 35), 
386. 




separate opinion in the Armed Activities case, Judge Simma confirmed Uganda’s standing as a third 
party on the basis of violations of international humanitarian law.38 A more recent case, which is 
related to the wider context of armed conflicts, relates to the unsuccessful 2014 application of the 
Marshall Islands against India and Pakistan. The Marshall Islands based their claim, inter alia, on a 
violation of the erga omnes character of the customary law obligation to negotiate in good faith 
effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race.39 
In contrast, it is still strongly disputed whether states are entitled to take non-forcible coercive 
countermeasure in cases of a violation of a rule of an erga omnes character. The Articles on State 
Responsibility do not settle the dispute because Art. 54 ASR40 contains a restrictive saving clause. 
Based on an analysis of state practice, Christian Tams has argued that all states are entitled to take 
countermeasures in response to “systematic and large-scale” violation of peremptory norms. He 
concedes, however, that there is no universal support for an entitlement to take such measures.41 A 
widespread criticism claims that most of the pertinent practice only concerns Western states.42 This 
is exemplified by the recent practice of the European Union, Australia, Canada, Japan, Switzerland 
and the United States in relation to the Russian annexation of the Ukrainian territory of Crimea.43 
                                                        
38 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda) (Merits) [2005] ICJ 
Rep, 168,, para. 37. Moreover, the IDI in 2005 recognized legal standing in cases of a violation of an erga omnes 
obligation, see Giorgio Gaja, ‘Obligations erga omnes in international law’ (2006) vol. 71(II) Annuaire de 
l’Institut de droit international 286, Art 3. 
39 The case was dismissed in 2016 because the applicants could not establish that a dispute existed between 
the parties; Obligations concerning Negotiations relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear 
Disarmament (Marshall Islands v. India) ICJ Press Release 2016/29 <http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/158/19128.pdf > accessed 13 October 2016; Obligations concerning Negotiations relating to 
Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marshall Islands v. Pakistan) ICJ Press 
Release 2016/30 <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/159/19130.pdf> accessed 13 October 2016. 
40 Article 54. Measures taken by States other than an injured State: 
“This chapter does not prejudice the right of any State, entitled under article , paragraph 1, to invoke the 
responsibility of another State, to take lawful measures against that State to ensure cessation of the 
breach and reparation in the interest of the injured State or of the beneficiaries of the obligation 
breached.” 
41 Tams, Enforcing obligations erga omnes (n 22) 198-251, 311; see also Martin Dawidowicz, ‘Public Law 
Enforcement without Public Law Safeguards? An Analysis of State Practice on Third-Party Countermeasures 
and their Relationship to the UN Security Council’ (2007 OUP) Vol. 77 BYIL 333, 333 et seqq. 
42 See para 6, of the commentary to art 54 ARSIWA, ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the 
Work of its 53rd Session’ (23 April-1 June and 2 July-10 August 2001) UN Doc A/56/10, 139.  
43 Statement by Australian Prime Minister Abbott, ‘Expanded Sanctions Against Russia’ (1 September 2014) 
http://www.pm.gov.au/media/2014-09-01/expanded-sanctions-against-russia>; Government of Canada, 
Special Economic Measures (Russia) Regulations (SOR/2014-58) (17 March 2014) 
http://laws.justice.gc.ca/eng/regulations/SOR-2014-58/FullText.html; G 7, Ukraine/declaration by the G7 in 
The Hague – Communiqué issued by the Presidency of the Republic, The Hague, 25 March 2014, 
http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/G7-ready-to-intensify-actions-over#ukraine-declaration-the-the-hague-
communique; ‘Statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan on the Additional Measures Imposed on 
Russia in Connection with the Ukraine Situation’ (25 September 2014) 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_000445.html; Swiss Federal Council, ‘Ordonnance instituant 
des mesures visant à empêcher le contournement de sanctions internationales en lien avec la situation en 
Ukraine’ (27 August 2014) http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/20142202/index.html; US, 
President Obama’s Executive Orders 13660-13662 of 6, 17 and 20 March 2014 (as amended on 16 July and 12 
Sept. 2014); http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Pages/ukraine.aspx; US 
Department of the Treasury Press Release, ‘Announcement of Additional Treasury Sanctions on Russian 
Financial Institutions and on a Defense Technology Entity’ (29 July 2014), http://www.treasury.gov/press-
center/press-releases/Pages/jl2590.aspx; White House Press Release, ‘Statement by the President on New 
Sanctions Related to Russia’ (11 September 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2014/09/11/statement-president-new-sanctions-related-russia; US Department of the Treasury Press 
Release, ‘Announcement of Expanded Treasury Sanctions within the Russian Financial Services, Energy and 
Defense or Related Materiel Sectors’ (12 September 2014), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-




Apparently, non-Western states did not enact such countermeasures. In June 2016, in a “Common 
Declaration of the Promotion of International Law” China and Russia voiced sharp criticism of 
“unilateral sanctions”.44 While other instances point to a more widespread practice, in particular in 
the context of apartheid, 45  many commentators still conclude that non-forcible coercive 
countermeasure are surrounded by legal uncertainty.46 
b) Emerging positive obligations? 
While the legal entitlement to take non-forcible countermeasures is already disputed, the idea of 
enforcement duties is even more difficult to ground in contemporary international law. According 
to Art. 41 para. 1 ASR, states shall cooperate to bring to an end through lawful means any serious 
breach of an obligation arising under a peremptory norm. From the perspective of the protection of 
community interests, such duties of cooperation might be seen as a particularly important 
progressive development since they are intrinsically related to the notion of solidarity. 47 
Cooperation guarantees collective action and counteracts the dangers of unilateral law-
enforcement.48 While the ICJ’s findings on Art. 1 of the Genocide Convention promote the idea of 
positive obligations to prevent genocide,49 the status50 and scope of a general and broad obligation 
to cooperate is far from clear.51 Neither state practice nor judicial findings are sufficient to support 
the doctrinal assumption that “where the effectiveness of measures rests on universality, States 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
releases/Pages/jl2629.aspx; White House Press Release, ‘Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect 
to Ukraine’ (2 March 2016), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/03/02/notice-continuation-
national-emergency-respect-ukraine.  
44 China/Russia, ‘The Declaration of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China on the 
Promotion of International Law’ (25 June 2016), http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/position_word_order/-
/asset_publisher/6S4RuXfeYlKr/content/id/2331698.   
45 Martin Dawidowicz, ‘Third-party countermeasures: a progressive development of international law?’ (2016) 
29 QIL, 3, at 11; see cases described by Sicilianos, ‘Countermeasures in Response,’ in: Crawford and others 
(eds.), The Law of International Responsibility (n 14) 1137, 1147; Tams, Enforcing obligations erga omnes (n 22) 
235-239; measures by the Council of the League of Arab States in the cases of Libya and Syria were taken in the 
institutionalized context of the League. 
46 Christian Tams, ‘Countermeasures against Multiple Responsible Actors,’ in: André Nollkaemper and others 
(eds.), Principles of Shared Responsibility in International Law: An Appraisal of the State of the Art (CUP 2014) 
312, 319; Tom Ruys, ‘Sanctions, Retorsions and Countermeasures: Concepts and International Legal 
Framework,’ in: Larissa van den Herik (ed.), Research Handbook on UN Sanctions and International Law 
(Edward Elgar Publishing 2016) (Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2760853, accessed 13 October 
2016), 27; Robin Geiß, ‘Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions – Scope and content of the obligation to 
ensure respect – narrow but deep or wide and shallow?’, in: Heike Krieger (ed.), Inducing Compliance with 
International Humanitarian Law: Lessons from the Great Lakes Region (CUP 2015) 417, 436; for a restrictive 
reading of the erga omnes effect as being confined to standing in legal proceedings, see Judge Higgins, Legal 
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall (Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins) [2004] ICJ Rep 207 paras. 154 et 
seq.  
47 Aust, Complicity (n 5) 354; Nina Joergensen, The Responsibility of States for International Crimes (OUP 2000) 
695. 
48 Aust, Complicity (n 5) 364. 
49 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v Yugoslavia) (Preliminary Objections) (Judgement) [1995] ICJ Rep 595, para. 31. 
50 ILC, ‘Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries’ (2001) 
ILC-Ybk, vol. II, Part Two, para. 3 is not clear whether this is a codification of general international law or a 
progressive development. 
51 Joergensen, The Responsibility of States (n 47) 697. 




may not claim neutrality,”52 at least in relation to violations of the prohibition on the use of force 
outside Chapter VII of the UN Charter.53  
A different development can be observed under Common Art. 1 GC I-IV. The understanding of the 
guardian function of states, which was at first restricted to their organs and to individuals under 
their jurisdiction, was broadened to include a duty to take positive measures and ensure 
compliance with the Geneva Conventions by other states and by violent non-state actors.54 This 
interpretation has been developed by way of an interpretation of Common Art. 1 GC I-IV on the 
basis of subsequent practice: Although the Pictet Commentary of 1952 already points in the 
direction of an erga omnes effect,55 there are no indications in the travaux préparatoires that such 
an understanding was already envisaged.56 Likewise, the re-inclusion of the wording in subsequent 
treaties cannot be seen as pertinent subsequent agreements according to Art. 31 para. 3 lit. a) VCLT, 
since no explicit discussions about such an understanding took place.57 Accordingly, there are still 
voices in the literature which even doubt the binding force of the provision.58 However, starting 
with the Teheran Conference on Human Rights in 196859 and promoted by the 1970 Barcelona 
Traction case, corresponding state practice unfolded and was supported by further jurisprudence60 
according to Art. 31 para. 3 lit b) and Art. 32 VCLT.61 Moreover, the Security Council,62 the General 
Assembly63 and the Human Rights Council64 contributed to the development by calling upon states 
to ensure respect for the Geneva Conventions by other contracting states.65  
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While the duty to take positive measures under Common Art. 1 GC I-IV provides for a broad margin, 
it nonetheless includes a basic positive obligation. The 2016 ICRC Commentary describes a broad 
variety of positive measures which have been used in state practice in order to comply with this 
duty. Such measures range from diplomatic dialogues or confidential protests over requests for a 
meeting of the High Contracting parties to using retorsions or adopting lawful, i.e., non-forcible, 
countermeasures.66 Yet it is disputed whether Common Art. 1 GC I-IV includes such a right or duty to 
take countermeasures.67 Indeed, there are no indications in state practice that Art. 1 GC I-IV is 
conceived in a broader way than the general rules on state responsibility in this respect. Still, the 
provision goes considerably further than these rules in that it is not confined to a serious violation 
of a peremptory norm but might relate to any breach of the Conventions.68  
The findings in the ICJ’s Wall Opinion that all states parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention are 
obliged to ensure compliance by Israel, even by taking positive measures, has attracted criticism 
from Judges Higgins69 and Kooijmans.70 While Judge Kooijmans accepts that duties of abstention 
might result from Common Art. 1 GC I-IV, he criticizes that it remains unclear how to determine 
what positive actions are required by a state.71 The criticism of Judge Kooijmans alludes to a 
broader problem related to rights and duties to take positive measures in the community interest. 
States enjoy a broad discretion whether to act at all or what measures to take. Yet criteria to 
establish their responsibility for failure to act are not readily available, not least because of the 
dearth of court decisions. In contrast, duties of abstention are clear-cut obligations which form a 
comparatively precise basis for findings on state responsibility and thus further legal certainty. 
They circumscribe a precise level of what solidarity requires as a reaction to a violation of a 
peremptory norm of international law.72 
c) Duties of abstention 
Admittedly, third states’ duties of abstention might only be a relevant instrument for furthering 
community interests in jus ad bellum and jus in bello because these rules deal with sovereignty 
and inter-state relations. Therefore, they are still seen as a part of the traditional bilateral law of 
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coordination. 73 However, in a decentralized order legally coordinated duties can work as a 
functional equivalent for an institutionalized collective security system. The parallel compliance of 
states with precisely determined duties of abstention serves community interests74 probably even 
better than broad margins of discretion. Thus, automatic duties of abstention for third states in the 
law of neutrality75 can be seen as a way of realizing community interests in a traditional form. 
 Duties of abstention as a means to protect community interests under traditional aa)
international law 
Before the First World War, the law of neutrality had developed such automatic duties of 
abstention for third parties in armed conflicts: While the neutral state bore a duty of 
nonparticipation and impartiality, it had the corollary right not to be adversely affected by the 
conflict. The duty of nonparticipation required the neutral state not to render any assistance to a 
belligerent party and forbade the treatment of belligerents in an unjustified differential manner.76 
In a war, the duties under the Hague Conventions V and VII and under customary international law 
were automatically applicable.77 Therefore, the law of neutrality expressed the idea that war legally 
concerns all states and not only the belligerent parties.78 It departed from the traditional bilateral 
paradigm in that the legal relationship was not confined to the belligerents. Instead war brought 
about a new legal relationship for neutral third states79 and became a separate legal regime. For 
the automatic and parallel application of the rules, certain basic procedures were established, 
such as the duty to notify third states about the outbreak of a war.80 
Accordingly, an important aspect of rendering peace a community interest is already embodied in 
the law of neutrality in that it is meant to promote international stability and security.81 Whereas 
this legal regime also serves to protect the vital self-interests of belligerents82 as well as of neutral 
states,83 it first and foremost fulfills “a conflict restraining function.”84 It draws a distinction 
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between neutral states and belligerents, promotes abstention, furthers impartiality, and thus aims 
to stop the conflict from escalating and spreading.85 The law of neutrality apparently contributed to 
a certain stability in the international relations of that period because states did not have to fear 
being pulled into conflicts.86  
 Modifying duties of abstention  bb)
The goal of protecting community interests has not only promoted more or less successful efforts 
to establish positive rights and obligations in international law, but it has also modified preexisting 
duties of abstention. Whereas institutionalization and collectivization have prompted structural 
changes within existing legal regimes modifying the law of neutrality under the UN Charter, the 
peremptory effect of the prohibition on the use of force has influenced the standards of 
responsibility. 
While it is generally acknowledged that a state can still declare its neutrality under the UN 
Charter,87 the system of collective security restricts this discretion in the interest of international 
peace and security at least in two ways: the duty to comply with a sanction regime imposed by the 
Security Council under Chapter VII (Arts. 41, 42, 43, and 48 UN Charter) excludes a neutral stance.88 A 
case in point was the economic sanction regime in the armed conflict between Iraq and Kuwait.89 
Likewise, a UN member state cannot invoke neutrality when the Security Council has determined 
the aggressor in a binding resolution under Chapter VII. In such a situation a member state must 
not support the aggressor90 while it can supply support to the state attacked91 but is not required 
to do so.92 Correspondingly, Art. 2 para. 5 UN Charter states that states shall refrain from giving 
assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement 
action.  
In relation to the rules on the use of force, its peremptory nature has promoted stricter standards 
of responsibility than third-party duties under the more general standards of the law of state 
responsibility. As a primary law rule, there is a particularly strict standard for a duty of abstention 
included in Art. 3 lit. f of the 1974 Definition of Aggression which provides for an objective standard 
of responsibility and does not require any subjective element on the side of the third state.93 It will 
therefore qualify as an act of aggression if a state allows its territory “which it has placed at the 
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disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of aggression 
against a third State.“ Moreover, on the level of the rules on state responsibility, Art. 41 para. 2 ASR 
includes a duty not to render aid or assistance in maintaining a situation created by a serious 
breach of a peremptory norm.94 This article also provides for a stricter standard on complicity in 
comparison to Art. 16 ASR,95 which includes the general rule on aid and assistance. The standard is 
rendered stricter by a modification of the subjective element of knowledge or intent.96 Although 
one might argue that the simple reason for such a modification lies in the fact that a grave 
violation of the use of force or prohibition of aggression will not go unnoticed and will be subject 
to widespread assessments of its lawfulness, it is also conceivable that the character of the 
prohibition as embodying a community interest promotes the stricter standard.97 In particular, in 
traditional cases of the violation of the use of force where territorial acquisition is involved, the 
rationale behind such a modification of standards aims at preventing any form of prescription 
through acquiescence lest legal effects be accorded to an illegal act of particular gravity.98  
Common Art. 1 GC I-IV as an autonomous primary obligation also entails stricter standards of 
responsibility than the secondary rules on state responsibility under Art. 16 ASR, insofar as a mere 
encouragement of violations of international humanitarian law is sufficient to violate the rule, 
while in general international law incitement or encouragement does not entail responsibility.99 
According to some views in the literature and according to the ICRC, the requirement of a 
subjective element is also modified.100 The argument is based on the wording of Common Art. 1 GC 
I-IV: the states parties have subscribed to a more specific and thus stricter legal duty to ensure 
respect, inter alia, by using the word “undertake.” On the basis of the 2007 ICJ Genocide case,101 the 
word “to undertake” is considered to be “not merely hortatory and purposive.”102 
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 Tendencies of erosion cc)
Moreover, duties of abstention are not necessarily an expression of indifference and sovereignty-
based understandings of non-interference, but help to protect peace by aiming to contain war and 
its effects in a decentralized system: the violation of the prohibition on the use of force or 
violations of international humanitarian law may be subject to widespread assessments of their 
lawfulness. Nonetheless, there may be significant disagreement about legally permissible 
justifications or about legal attribution of the wrongful act. Conflicting community interests may 
have to be balanced and the prioritization of one community interest over another may be abused 
or might appear to be abused for covering more self-interested policy aims. In particular, in non-
international armed conflict, the risk of abuse by intervening states is high where military aid is 
given to rebels which aim to overthrow a government.103 Moreover, empirical research suggests that 
support for all sides of an armed conflict prolongs the conflict.104 
An important duty of abstention stipulates that third states must not supply arms to rebel groups. 
This duty has been stated in the ICJ’s Nicaragua Judgment105 and the Armed Activities Case106 as well 
as in the Friendly Relations Declaration.107 Such an arms transfer violates both the prohibition on 
the use of force and the duty of non-intervention.108 Moreover, Common Art. 1 GC I-IV prohibits the 
transfer of weapons to state parties or armed groups, which have violated international 
humanitarian law.109 
These well-established duties of third parties to abstain from certain forms of intervention have 
been challenged in recent armed conflicts. In the Libyan conflict, France, Qatar and the UK have 
delivered weapons to armed opposition groups. In the Syrian conflict,110 Saudi Arabia and Qatar111 
as well as France, the UK, the U.S. and probably Croatia have delivered weapons to armed 
opposition groups which have reportedly violated international humanitarian law.112 Also, the EU at 
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the request of France and the UK changed its position and started to allow such weapon supplies 
to armed groups.113  
Legal justifications for these activities are not readily available.114 It has been argued in the case of 
Libya that any justification cannot rely on an implicit interpretation of the pertinent Security 
Council resolution because the explicit prohibition on arming rebels and an explicit authorization 
are lacking.115 In the case of Syria, it is doubtful whether the supply of weapons to violent non-state 
actors could be justified by an argument a maiore ad minus even if one acknowledges that 
humanitarian intervention is a valid exception to the prohibition of the use of force. Likewise, 
neither authorization by the Security Council nor self-defense or the concept of forcible 
countermeasures can be used as a justification,116 and it cannot be assumed that the Syrian 
Opposition Council has validly been recognized as the new de jure government.117 Finally, in both 
conflicts rebel forces also breached international humanitarian law so that any delivery of 
weapons would not be in line with the obligation to ensure respect under the Geneva Conventions 
and their Additional Protocols.118  
The strong call for protecting the individual in R2P situations, such as in Libya or Syria, seems to 
push governments to send weapons to armed opposition groups, thereby eroding well established 
rules on the prohibition on the use of force and non-intervention. For instance, the French supply 
of weapons to Libyan opposition groups was politically justified as a means of protecting 
civilians. 119 British and U.S. justifications also relied on civilian protection. 120 After diplomatic 
pressure from the UK and France, the EU amended its blanket EU arms embargo to all parties to 
the conflict in Syria and justified its activities by the intent to enable protection of civilians.121  
Of course, the mere violation of a customary international law rule, let alone a treaty rule, does not 
per se trigger its derogation, but if there is a scarcity of state protests, a negligent attitude by 
states can potentially lead to a modification of applicable customary international law rules on the 
basis of acquiescence.122 In the Syrian conflict, at least, Austria voiced concern123 and there was 
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strong protest from Russia,124 but criticism is mainly articulated by academia and NGOs.125 While it 
would be too early to draw the conclusion that the pertinent prohibitions have fallen into 
desuetude,126 the example demonstrates that disagreements about the prioritization of community 
interests (peace through containment of conflicts v. human rights protection by civilian protection) 
threaten to undermine well established duties of abstention. What might appear to be a sound 
political compromise could also turn out to bear considerable adverse effects. In a multipolar 
world, Western states should only engage in norm dilution of duties of abstention if they are 
prepared to accept that other powers will support rebels in other civil wars according to their 
political preferences or perceptions of a hierarchy of community interests.  
3. Community interests and the progressive development of third-party rights and duties 
in armed conflict 
Strictly speaking, the lawmaking process on third-party rights and duties has stagnated. While 
duties of abstention, above all the duty of non-recognition and non-assistance, are well 
established, more far-reaching rights and duties to take positive measures are still tentative or at 
least disputed. Priority shifts even suggest tendencies of regression. There is still a dearth of 
conclusive state practice and only few decisions of the ICJ or other international tribunals exist. As 
long as states remain too reluctant or too cautious to defend community interests by instituting 
legal proceedings on armed conflicts before international courts,127 their competence to do so will 
be disputed and it is unlikely that further positive obligations of third states will be developed. 
What are the reasons for the lack of a more decisive development of the law in the community 
interest?  
a) Competing guardians of community interests: States, the ICJ and the ICRC 
Given that the ICJ has fostered the erga omnes concept in the Barcelona Traction case and 
described the “outlawing of acts of aggression” as an example of erga omnes obligations,128 many 
authors expect the court to act as a decisive guardian of community interests also in the realm of 
armed conflict. After all, the ICJ is – so far – the only or at least the most important court to judge 
on issues of jus ad bellum and jus in bello alike. Yet the Court appears to act very cautiously in 
cases concerning armed conflicts. It has so far not explicitly 129  determined the jus cogens 
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character130 or erga omnes effect of the broader prohibition on using force, even though in the 
Nicaragua case both parties had accepted its peremptory nature.131 Likewise, in the Oil Platforms 
case the Court shunned any such pronouncement.132 While a simple reason for this might be seen 
in the existence of a specific regime for countermeasures with the collective right of self-defense 
under Art. 51 UN-Charter,133 contemporary literature criticizes that in cases concerning community 
interests “the Court is anything but most reticent to engage in any project to translate a conception 
of the common good or of a universal conscience into law.”134 The Court is seen to keep an 
ambiguous and inconsequential attitude towards peremptory norms and the concept of the 
international community.135 Peremptory norms promoting community interest “remain at best a 
juridical fiction channelling the traditional processes of international law-formation.” Thus, some 
authors denounce a role for the ICJ in the progressive development of international law.136  
However, the Court faces the task of balancing its juridical functions with the primary function of 
states in lawmaking. While a court does not create law, it has an important role in the lawmaking 
process through applying the law to new situations and thereby developing it. By stating that a 
certain practice has crystallized into a rule of customary international law, it also contributes to 
the creation of that rule.137 Still, not least in the interest of its legitimacy, the Court needs to 
acknowledge the role of states and of the political organs of the UN.138 This not only concerns legal 
policy considerations of judicial activism or judicial self-restraint, but signifies a search for an 
appropriate form of balance of power within a legal system. Thereby the Court also tries to ensure 
compliance with its judgments. Recent contestations of certain decisions of international courts by 
their member states139 underline that these courts are under constant pressure to get the balance 
right. While the ICJ has gone through different periods in that balancing process,140 it presently 
seems to adopt a careful attitude. For instance, in the Wall Opinion the ICJ has determined that 
there is a duty of non-recognition, of not rendering aid and assistance, and to ensure respect for 
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the Geneva Conventions. 141  Still, it did not make any pronouncement on the scope of the 
obligations involved. The Court apparently left this task to the political organs of the UN:  
Finally, the Court is of the view that the United Nations, and especially the General Assembly and 
the Security Council, should consider what further action is required to bring to an end the 
illegal situation resulting from the construction of the wall and the associated régime, taking 
due account of the present Advisory Opinion.142  
A comparable hesitation to easily accept the role of non-state actors as promoters of new 
obligations in the community interest lies beneath the Separate Opinions of Judges Higgins143 and 
Kooijmans. Judge Kooijmans refuses to accept the ICRC’s role in interpreting Art. 1 GC I-IV, pointing 
to a lack of corresponding state practice.144 Indeed, the ICRC has taken a more pronounced role in 
the lawmaking process, which has apparently prompted the inclusion of positive obligations under 
Common Art. 1 GC I-IV according to a widespread reading of the article.  
Such a progressive development is, at first sight, surprising. Apart from Security Council measures, 
centralized institutions are lacking in international humanitarian law. The Geneva Conventions do 
not provide for any kind of binding inter-state dispute mechanism145 and existing mechanisms 
which could play a role are not in function, such as the Fact-Finding Commission under Art. 90 AP I. 
Moreover, international humanitarian law is not only directed at protecting a community interest 
but also regulates fundamental security interests of states.146 However, the guardian function of 
the ICRC seems to promote law-development in the public interest.  
The ICRC can claim a formal, legally acknowledged role based on Article 5(2)(c) of the Statutes of 
the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. In promoting the “faithful application of 
international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts and to take cognizance of any 
complaints based on alleged breaches of that law,” the ICRC needs to interpret international 
humanitarian law and thus contributes to the lawmaking process. Moreover, Art. 5(2)(g) of the 
Statutes explicitly recognizes the role of the ICRC in preparing any development of international 
humanitarian law. By acknowledging this role in the Statutes, the state parties to the Geneva 
Conventions themselves established the lawmaking function of the ICRC.147 Expressions of these 
efforts are the Customary International Law Study, 148  the Interpretative Guidance on Direct 
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Participation in Hostilities, 149  and the new edition of the commentaries on the Geneva 
Conventions.150 In particular, the 1952 ICRC Commentary on Common Art. 1 GC I-IV has determined 
the interpretative debate,151 while the new edition aims to settle it. 
However, the ICRC’s strong engagement in the progressive development of international 
humanitarian law has raised severe criticism from state parties, which have called into question 
the ICRC’s mandate, method and expertise, in particular in relation to the Customary International 
Law Study and the Interpretative Guidance on Direct Participation in Hostilities.152 Recent initiatives 
to further develop mechanisms for improving compliance with international humanitarian law have 
seen an even stronger pushback by states irrespective of the community interests implied. After 
the 2011 International Conference of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent, the ICRC together with 
Switzerland promoted a process to strengthen compliance. The process was deliberately not 
turned into a draft for a binding international agreement because the ICRC and some member 
states already anticipated that a negotiating process would fail, or that “the level of ambition” in 
such negotiations would be reduced. But even the turn to informal standards did not save the 
process from failing. In view of strong opposition from Russia and India, the adopted resolution153 
represented a compromise that remained far behind the expectations. It was not possible to 
introduce a meaningful compliance mechanism with reporting duties. Instead the resolution 
focuses on a state-driven process and sidelines the ICRC. This development seems to reflect a 
distrust of some states towards the ICRC. It repeats an ongoing reluctance of states to subject 
themselves to any enforcement mechanism which gives third states a forum to investigate, 
evaluate or just discuss the behavior of parties to an armed conflict.  
Apparently, states are reclaiming their role as norm-makers in international humanitarian law 
more vigorously than during the past decade. They seem to oppose – at least to some extent – the 
increasing autonomy of other actors who might contribute to a progressive development of the law 
of armed conflict. But does this imply that states fail their responsibility for developing the law in 
the community interest? 
b) Duties of abstention as a moderate yet stable way to further community interests in armed 
conflict 
From a structural perspective, the right to institute proceedings before a court, or to take non-
forcible countermeasures, is usually conceived as being discretionary. Even where positive duties 
exist as under Common Art. 1 GC I-IV, there is a broad discretion as to what measures states must 
take.154 Such a margin leaves room for vital policy considerations. In situations of armed conflict, 
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diverging community interests as well as relevant national interests will have to be balanced 
against one another. The Syrian example demonstrates the adverse effects that a balancing 
exercise between efforts to provide for civilian protection and efforts to prevent the escalation and 
perpetuation of an armed conflict can provoke. Escalation of conflicts, prospects and progress of 
negotiations and peace deals, and the political symbolism of taking countermeasures against any 
particular actor are among the interests to be considered. Such interests do not reflect individual 
“selfish” interests of states but are themselves more or less directly related to the community 
interests involved. Taking measures which are not effective will in general imply higher political 
costs than complying with a duty of abstention.155 In cases concerning the use of force, states will 
be reluctant to bring their allies before an international court and it is highly unlikely that they will 
use non-forcible countermeasures against them. Thus, while the legality of U.S. unilateralism in 
Iraq and one-sided interpretations of UN Security Council resolutions regarding NATO interventions 
in Libya were disputed among NATO allies, they did not lead to enforcement measures by Western 
states. This in turn had an eroding impact on international reactions to the illegal annexation of 
the Ukrainian territory of Crimea. The General Assembly resolution156 denouncing the annexation as 
a violation of international law was only passed with 100 yes-votes, 11 no-votes and 58 abstentions. 
Apparently Brazil, India, and South Africa were motivated to abstain from voting due to Western 
states’ behavior in Iraq and Libya and the allegation of applying double standards.157 
A discretionary approach to decentralized countermeasures heightens the impression of selectivity 
and double standards and may even negatively reflect on the centralized system of collective 
security under the UN Charter. Unilateral countermeasures continue to suffer from a legitimacy 
deficit. Far-reaching rights and duties to take positive measures depend on centralized institutions 
or institutional mechanisms for claiming sufficient legitimacy.158 While the Security Council could 
be and has partly been a central organ for defending community interests via third party 
obligations in armed conflicts, its recent and recurring failures have provoked decentralized 
unilateral measures whose legality is doubtful. The case of weapons delivery to Syrian rebels is a 
case in point. Because of their perceived selectivity, such measures undermine the basis of good 
faith and trust. Good faith and trust, however, build an indispensable precondition for any concept 
of international solidarity. 
4. Unilateralism and positive duties in a changing global order 
The idea of decentralized enforcement of community interests gained strong momentum after the 
adoption of the Articles of State Responsibility contemporaneously with the heyday of the R2P 
debate. Both concepts – R2P and non-forcible rights and duties to protect community interests – 
share structural parallels.159 The risk implied in countermeasures was framed in terms of finding 
the right balance between the “effective protection of community values and the need to prevent 
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abuse” by powerful states claiming to act on behalf of the international community.160 It was thus 
closely linked to an American-led liberal international system161 because it concerned a balancing 
exercise between enforcement of a liberal perception of community interests and the dangers of 
power abuse in a unipolar world order. Not without reason, Western states were seen as being the 
major proponents of a right to take countermeasures. However, in that period Western states 
apparently did not manage to establish what standards of legality and legitimacy apply regarding 
such actions. 162 Of course, one might read the continuing debates as “witness to the slow 
establishment of the concept of community.” 163 But in an alternative reading, the push for 
unilateral ways to prioritize humanitarian community interests over more sovereign-related ones 
has contributed to undermining existing rules, while new rules have not been able to evolve with 
sufficient clarity. Recent tendencies of erosion of the duty not to support rebels, for instance, are 
not matched by a rise of well-established new rules for deciding how to prioritize conflicting 
community interests in the face of ongoing armed conflicts. Such a development contributes to an 
increase of normative uncertainty in the regime on the use of force164 and thus to a perception of 
crisis or even failure.165 
In contrast, duties of abstention further community interests by aiming to contain the effects of a 
violation of such a rule. An approach emphasizing duties of abstention is informed by the idea that 
immediate reactions to wrongful acts by abstention might help to prevent escalation of conflicts at 
an early stage166 – a stage where according to empirical studies third-party intervention in non-
international armed conflicts tends to prolong the duration of the conflict.167 The involvement of 
third states increases the complexity of conflicts and will thus make any peaceful solution even 
more difficult to attain. Especially in view of the interrelatedness of states in a globalized world, 
duties of abstention can be an efficient means. Abstaining from certain interactions will affect 
perpetrating states more severely than it did in previous times.168 A way forward for promoting 
community interests through third-party obligations might thus lie in refocusing on de-escalation 
through the more traditional means of containing war: duties of neutrality, abstention and 
nonintervention for third states. 
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